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Building Community 
 Introduction 
That organizations cannot be viewed as uniform and stable cultures or entities but rather 
as communities of “loosely constituted overlapping circles of partialled participation” (Blau, 
1996: 174) is not a new insight (e.g., Bechky, 2003; Bloor and Dawson, 1994; Dougherty, 
1992). To make sense of this world of competing communities, one needs to understand why 
these subcultures exist, how they form, how they interact—cooperatively and competitively—
and how they evolve. In what follows, we address these issues by providing an integrated 
view of the two theoretical approaches that have built on this thinking: communities of prac-
tice (CoP) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). The concept of interpretive communities 
(ICs), which we propose, builds upon important findings related to both CoP and CDA but 
overcomes their shortcomings and extends them onto a more general theoretical footing. 
Communities of practice, critical discourse analysis and interpretative communities 
CoP research claims that different communities exist because individuals are engaged in 
different activities or practices and knowledge transfer is possible only between individuals 
within a particular practice (e.g., Brown and Duguid, 1991, 2001; Gherardi and Nicolini, 
2002; Lave and Wenger, 2002). Table 1 summarizes the main assumptions of the CoP view 
and offers a critical discussion of these assumptions. It shows that the CoP approach does not 
explain the role of human cognition and power for knowledge transfer and learning. In con-
trast, the concept of ICs emphasizes that cognition cannot be separated from practice and ac-
tion and puts stronger emphasis on the connection between power and cognition. 
INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE 
According to CDA, organizations consist of multiple non-neutral and biased discourses 
that serve as “sites of power” that influence individuals’ interpretations (Mumby and Stohl, 
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1991: 316).i
Following van Dijk’s (1993: 251) proposition that cognition is the “missing link” be-
tween discourse and action, it is the contention put forward here that the concept of ICs is the 
missing theoretical link within CDA. Furthermore, our discussion outlines the concrete steps 
by which a particular discourse develops into a dominant position, a key missing component 
of CDA. 
 Supporters of CDA analyze how interpretations and perspectives have been “dis-
cursively constructed over time by groups in power aiming to skew social reality and institu-
tionalized [knowledge] to their own advantage” (Heracleous, 2004: 186). Although CDA em-
phasizes the role of social practices and non-discursive elements for the creation and dissemi-
nation of discourses and power (e.g., Fairclough, 2005), the approach does not refer explicitly 
to the cognitive element of discourses. Texts are central to the analysis, not the brains that 
produce these texts. Thus, “where do the discourses, narratives, texts and words that are ana-
lyzed in organizational discourse come from?” (Marshak et al., 2000: 250) remains an open 
question.  
Beginning with the viewpoint that “a firm is composed of a group of people who all, in 
varying ways and to varying extents, interpret what they observe and take decisions according 
to their interpretation” (Loasby, 1983: 357), we argue that individuals with shared interpretive 
strategies and shared discourses—i.e., who employ a common frame of reference for inter-
preting their social settings—build an IC (Fish, 1980; Hymes, 1980). In order to get a more 
complete picture of how knowledge is acquired, created, processed and managed (Bechky, 
2003) and who influences this process, we must understand the ongoing process of interaction 
between members of different communities. Furthermore, because knowledge transfer and 
learning are inherently political processes, we need to discuss the nature of power as well as 
the micro processes through which the power—what we call interpretive dominance—of a 
particular community is developed. Our goal is to present the reader with a multifaceted pic-
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ture of human cognition and to show important implications for our understanding of power 
and its role on learning. 
Origin and nature of interpretive communities   
If knowledge is a product of human cognition (Bunge, 1996; Maturana, 1980; Neisser, 
1976), then what characterizes human cognition? Research in neurobiology shows that all 
cognitive processes are brain processes (e.g., Lakomski, 2004). Therefore, there are “no ideas 
in themselves but, instead, ideating brains” (Bunge, 1983: 23; also Lakomski, 2004; 
Maturana, 1980). At the same time, cognitive processes are in an intensive interaction with 
individuals’ natural and social environment where concepts and symbols—the basis of think-
ing—are expressed in words that derive their meaning from the way they are used in specific 
language games or discourses, which themselves are located in distinct social settings (Koppl 
and Langlois, 2001). Therefore, cognition and discourse are mutually constituted in a process 
of continuous interaction (Heracleous, 2004). Consequently, context and the embedded exist-
ing discourses influence cognition significantly; in other words, cognition is a situated pro-
cess. Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2003: 977-978) argue that this context can be interpreted as “a 
collectively generated and sustained domain of action” or “a language-mediated domain of 
sustained interactions”, and “to engage in collective work is to engage in a discursive prac-
tice”. Thus, knowledge is created and transferred within socio-culturally constituted ICs or 
discursive practices through an ongoing process of interaction between individuals (Bechky, 
2003). Cognition is both embodied, because people’s physical composition determines their 
thinking, and embedded, because the specific context and situations people find themselves 
determine cognition (Lakomski, 2004). 
The two major cognitive processes of perception and conception, together with action, are 
the sources of knowledge (Bunge, 1996: 76): “We get to know ideas by thinking of them, and 
concrete things by perceiving, conceiving, or manipulating them”. When perceiving some-
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thing, people construct a percept of it with sensations, memories, and expectations. They look 
for similarities and differences, and for patterns. This process, which is referred to as intuiting 
(Crossan et al., 1999) or sensemaking (Weick, 1979), involves the mapping of an event into 
one’s perceptual system (Bunge, 1983). The resulting cognitive maps are also called schemes. 
Perceptions themselves do not have a meaning. They can guide the actions of the individual, 
but they are difficult to share with others because they are non-verbal and subconscious 
(Crossan et al., 1999). Only through a process of interpreting do individuals assign a meaning 
to a particular perception (Neisser, 1976). Thus, meanings are the result of thinking processes.  
Schemes and their meanings are developed by individual experience. Therefore, “the same 
stimulus can evoke different or equivocal meaning for different people” (Crossan et al., 1999: 
528). However, research has shown that individuals confronted with similar or the same 
physical and cultural environment can develop similar schemes and meanings (Neisser, 
1976). In other words, the real world, which exists independently of our senses, enables indi-
viduals to develop some similar schemes and meanings.ii Through the course of regular social 
interaction in the form of communication, participation, and problem-solving, individuals 
begin to favour one interpretation over others and their exchange of experiences leads to the 
emergence of shared schemes and meaning (Gray et al., 1985; Zelizer, 1993). Through this 
process of interaction, individuals with similar interpretive positions build specific 
worldviews and “form” a community. As individuals become aware of how their thoughts are 
guided by such frameworks they can start to choose between them: through their involvement 
in multiple communities and discourses individuals “produce a discursive space in which 
[they] can play one discourse against the other, draw on multiple discourses to create new 
forms of interdiscursivity, and otherwise move between and across multiple discourses” (Har-
dy and Phillips, 2004: 304). In this way, different ICs evolve, made up of those who share 
interpretive frames (Fish, 1980; Hymes, 1980) but who are themselves members of many 
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evolving and potentially overlapping communities (e.g., Reihlen and Ringberg, 2004; Wat-
son, 1982). Over time, individuals establish “conventions” or “dominant perspectives” as to 
how community members can recognize, create, experience, and talk about social events and 
ICs transform into “communities of memory” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Zelizer, 1993). 
Therefore, ICs are instantiated both in the actions of their members and in their interpretations 
and interpretive schemes (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001: 758). They are cognitive communi-
ties that are a result of agents’ actions and interactions. 
An IC builds and expands through the shaping of individuals. As noted by Fish (1980), 
the thoughts of individuals have their source in some or other IC; thus, they are products of 
communities. At the same time, actors participating in these communities influence them 
through their ongoing interpretations and actions. For example, through the interaction with 
members of other ICs, individuals can introduce changes in a particular IC (Bloor and Daw-
son, 1994). Therefore, the shared meanings of communities are more or less often trans-
formed (Brown and Duguid, 1991) and large-scale changes in ICs can be caused by large-
scale, more-or-less simultaneous frame switches by many independent actors (DiMaggio, 
1997). Accordingly, ICs are fluid and evolving rather than unalterable “fixed systems of posi-
tions” (Clegg, 2001: 135; Carley, 1991). Some ICs can be quite durable whereas others are 
only short-lived; some are broad and expansive while others involve only a restricted number 
of members. 
ICs as discursive practices are maintained at the group level but operate and are mani-
fested through individuals’ shared cognitive maps (Harris, 1989). Thus, the selection of envi-
ronmental elements to be analyzed is likely to be affected by the shared schemes of an IC, and 
different schemes can lead to dramatically different analysis of the same event or topic (Fish, 
1980). Accordingly, members of different ICs may have problems in understanding one an-
other fully “if knowledge leaks in the direction of shared [meaning], it sticks where [meaning] 
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is not shared” (Brown and Duguid, 2001: 207). Therefore, different communities are often 
characterized by distinct perspectives rather than by mutual understanding (Gherardi and 
Nicolini, 2002). Misunderstandings can be expressed in several ways. For example, when 
looking at the same phenomenon, communities may not only see different solutions to the 
same problem but may also address quite different problems. Thus, communities may have 
problems in understanding each other’s language, “where each community maintains its own 
voice while listening to the voice of the Other, and where communication is both negotiated 
order and disorder” (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2002: 421). Furthermore, arguments that persuade 
one’s own community convincingly may have little or no weight with other communities 
(Boland and Tenkasi, 1995). Thus, ICs are characterized by different problem solving logics, 
which are a main reason for conflicts and communication problems in organizations (Carroll, 
1998). Successful cooperation between members of different ICs requires the translation of 
the different perspectives so that some alignment of meanings is achieved; yet, translation is 
also a mechanism of power (Clegg, 1989, 2001). 
The power of interpretive communities 
Because members of ICs are embedded in multiple discourses, they can “play one dis-
course against another, draw on multiple discourses to create a new form of interdiscursivity, 
and otherwise move between and across multiple discourses” (Hardy and Phillips, 2004: 304). 
Therefore, interactions between ICs are characterized by harmonization, negotiation of mean-
ings and the integration of interpretations as well as by contestations and struggles (Clegg, 
1989; Gherardi and Nicolini, 2002), the ultimate goal of which is the establishment of inter-
pretive dominance by one or a combination of communities (Callon, 1986; Meindl et al., 
1994). Thus, when ICs interact, power rather than rationality is at work (Bettenhausen and 
Murnighan, 1985; Flyvbjerg, 1998).  
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The concept of interpretive dominance examines “how the field of force in which power 
is arranged has been fixed, coupled and constituted in such a way that, intentionally or not, 
certain ‘nodal points’ of practice are privileged in this unstable and shifting terrain” (Clegg, 
1989: 17). It is based on the assumption that the power relations amongst groups and actors 
are dependent on knowledge and institutionalized “truths” and discourses (e.g., Foucault, 
1980). At the same time, actors influence existing power relations and institutionalized dis-
courses through their ongoing interpretations and actions (e.g., Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). 
Power and interpretive dominance 
Interpretive dominance emerges during agents’ interactions as a result of negotiations and 
translations of meanings. It “operates through the offering and acceptance of reasons for act-
ing in one way rather than another” (Scott, 2001: 13) and prevents agents from developing 
and legitimizing alternative interpretations. It is the result of rhetorical power; power, which 
is not predetermined by the possession or control of resources but is exercised through a set of 
“interpretive frames” (Mumby and Clair, 1997: 184). In it simplest form, rhetorical power 
rests upon a person’s personality and attractiveness to others; i.e., in their charisma (Scott, 
2001). However, rhetorical power is rarely the mere result of charisma. Rather, it is the result 
of cognitive and social processes, in which, “intrinsically appropriate reasons for action” are 
constructed and offered to others so that a particular course of action or decision comes to be 
seen as cognitively, morally, or emotionally appropriate (Scott, 2001). Such a persuasive in-
fluence does not depend on rational calculation but on arguments, appeals and reasons that 
cause individuals to believe that a particular decision or action is more appropriate than an-
other (Scott, 2001). Rhetorical power can operate through cognitive symbols—ideas and rep-
resentations that lead people to define situations in certain ways. It arises from the attribution 
of expertise or knowledge to the influencing agent and draws individuals into a particular in-
terpretive framework (Scott, 2001; Somech and Drach-Zahavy, 2002; van Dijk, 1993). Rhe-
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torical power can also operate through the building of value commitments to particular ideas 
or conditions (Somech and Drach-Zahavy, 2002) and arises when individuals “defer to the 
views of those whom they regard as especially fitted to speak on behalf of these values” 
(Scott, 2001: 15). Therefore, rhetorical power does not imply the mere rhetorical superiority 
based on a person’s charisma but also the power originating in cognitive symbols and argu-
ments and in value commitments.iii
Existing practices and discourses often advantage particular groups of actors without 
those groups being clearly connected to the establishing or maintenance of discourses and 
practices (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2005). Thus, “some individuals, by virtue of their position in 
the discourse, will warrant a louder voice than others, while others may warrant no voice at 
all” (Hardy and Phillips, 1999: 4). Therefore, agents with some positional power, power that 
is embedded in existing relations and is based on resources, are better able to influence dis-
courses and to develop interpretive dominance. At the same time, agents without positional 
power might be “silenced” (Brown and Coupland, 2005), with less chance to engage in dis-
courses and meaning creation:  “The most effective use of power occurs when those with 
power are able to get those without power to interpret the world from the former’s point of 
view” (Mumby and Clair, 1997: 184). For example, agents who mediate between different 
ICs can use their position as a connecting point to enforce their preferred interpretation by 
translating other perspectives in a manner favorable to them. In the following, we illustrate 
the process through which interpretive dominance develops and discuss some of the charac-
teristics of the single steps within this process. 
 
The emergence of interpretive dominance  
“The notion of interpretive dominance conceptualizes a belief system as an active arena, 
where interest groups […] compete to impose their preferred psychological order onto nonbe-
lievers” (Meindl et al., 1994: 291). Through the management of meanings and communica-
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tion, individuals and ICs can legitimate their interpretive positions and “institute a form of 
social control that removes the need to exercise control directly” (Phillips and Brown, 1993: 
1551). We illustrate this process by referring to Callon’s (1986) four “moments of transla-
tion”: problematization, interéssement, enrolment and mobilization. 
(1) Problematization 
Communication and coordinated action between members of different ICs are often prob-
lematic due to their different interpretations of the same issue, to misunderstandings, suspi-
cion and anxiety of disclosure when interactions occur (Czarniawska and Mazza, 2003). In-
teraction between members of different ICs is successful only when they develop some shared 
schemes and begin to act and interpret using these (Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985), im-
plying that some individuals must change their initial perspective (e.g., Mohammed and 
Ringseis, 2001). At the foundation of such a change is the attempt by some actors to manage 
meanings by introducing certain interpretations and establishing certain relations between 
interpretations (Benford and Snow, 2000; Gray et al., 1985). The goal is to associate the issue 
at hand with the preferred concept and perspective of these actors (Hardy et al., 2000). Thus, 
actors need to “engage” others into their interpretations and discourses.  
The first step in this process involves the embedding of the suggested perspective in a 
larger discursive context so that it would have meaning for the individuals to whom it is di-
rected (Hardy et al., 2000). This process has been called elsewhere “strategic fitting” or “re-
contextualization” (Benford and Snow, 2000; Fairclough, 2005) and encompasses the (inten-
tional) tailoring and fitting of interpretations to the background and experiences of the other 
party (Benford and Snow, 2000). Next, actors draw the others’ attention to certain aspects of 
their own experience, accenting and highlighting some issues or aspects as being more salient 
than others. In this way, they impose a pattern of meaning on otherwise ambiguous contexts 
(Gray et al., 2000). This process of meaning construction involves introducing certain con-
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cepts and interpretations, establishing certain relations between concepts, and imparting val-
ues as well as the use of a particular language (Gray et al., 1985; Lawrence et al., 2005). Al-
though it is possible to use rhetoric based on inspirational appeals and emotional requests in 
order to arouse enthusiasm by appealing on the other’s values and ideals, persuasions based 
on the use of logical arguments, factual evidence and existing discourses are the prevalent 
influence tactics at this stage (Yukl and Falbe, 1990). Thus, at this stage, cognitive persuasion 
prevails.  
If successful, actors establish themselves as “obligatory passage points” (Callon, 
1986)―agents with interpretive authority for others’ problems (Zelizer, 1993). These “nodal 
points” are pivotal locations within discourses and when institutionalized, represent “fixed” 
knowledge domains that are regarded as normal practice. Thus, “problematization seeks to 
construct ‘hegemony’ by fixing [obligatory passage points]” (Clegg 1989: 204).iv
(2) Interéssement 
 It is im-
portant to note that actors can engage in such problem formulation unintentionally: they will 
try to impose their interpretation of an issue because they are embedded in ICs and discourses 
that influence what they see and how they interpret what they see. However, other actors can 
also engage in translation and meaning creation by “counterframing”—by attempting to un-
dermine or neutralize an actor’s version and interpretive framework of the problem by creat-
ing a competing interpretation (Benford and Snow, 2000: 626). Such counterframing increas-
es the chance for actors to break out of standard, established interpretations and views and to 
develop novel understandings. However, it is difficult because actors first have to undo all the 
already existent interpretations (Callon, 1991). In this case, the next three steps of the “trans-
lating” process become even more important. 
In the second step of the translation process actors try to lock others into the roles or 
identities they have defined for them by erecting an interpretation that serves to block or neu-
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tralize all potential competing interpretations. One of the goals of this step is to prevent actors 
from counterframing. Through rhetorical strategies, actors further influence the construction 
of cognitive maps on the part of others. Actors’ rhetoric in this phase often utilizes emotional 
aspects by stressing that the suggested interpretation leads to a positive future to which the 
others are attracted and related to, implying that this particular interpretation will take them 
closer to a desired perspective and action (Ford and Ford, 1995). Thus, the use of symbolic 
and emotional appeals and, possibly, charisma is more prevalent than in the first phase. A 
successful “intéressement” results in the emergence of some “shared” understandings and 
confirms the validity of the suggested interpretation and the proposed role for the involved 
actors. However, an unsuccessful translation means that the individuals are no longer able to 
communicate, which will result in disalignment: actors “reconfigure themselves in separate 
spaces with no common measure” (Callon, 1991: 145).  
(3) Enrolment 
If “intéressement” is successful, a process of multilateral negotiations between actors 
takes place, coined “enrolment”, which aims at building alliances and coalitions with mem-
bers of other ICs. The goal is to “enact” what started as a discourse—to transform the pro-
posed interpretation into new ways of thinking, acting and interacting, into new ways of being 
and new identities, and, finally, in the materialization of the suggested interpretation, which 
can take form of new structures, rules, strategies, practices, etc. (Fairclough, 2005). Thus, in 
this phase, the interpretive schemes that actors started to share in the previous phase are en-
acted into concrete actions: the enrolled actors build coalitions and alliances and start to act as 
a cognitively coherent group in regard to the issue at hand.  
(4) Mobilization of allies 
This phase refers to methods and actions that ensure that interpretations, which were 
fixed in the previous phases, are widely dispersed through further discourses. It is important 
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to ensure that the already “enrolled” actors do not betray or undercut the fixed interpretation 
so established. At this point, individual statements and practices are accumulated and they 
start to influence the context for future discourse activities, “as prevailing discourses are con-
tested, displaced, transformed, modified or reinforced” (Hardy et al., 2000: 1236). At the 
same time, these existing discourses influence the process of dispersion of new interpreta-
tions, which makes it to an unpredictable process “since there are a number of contradictory 
ways in which knowledge can be consumed, some of which may be quite different from the 
intentions of the original producers” (Hardy and Phillips, 2004: 370). This is particularly the 
case when actors reinterpret the original interpretations and/or connect them in different ways 
to existing discourses. 
The role of rhetorical power in knowledge transfer and creation 
The rhetorical power that results in the interpretive dominance of particular ICs can have 
both constraining and enabling effects on learning processes. If the underlying interpretation 
is based on existing interpretations, rhetorical power is at work that further stabilizes and en-
dorses an existing discourse through the “locking” of others into established discourses. Such 
rhetorical power prevents the creation of novel interpretations and knowledge. With a grow-
ing dispersion of existing practices the diversity of interpretations decreases as members of 
ICs are “disciplined” by existing practices and discourses (Lawrence et al., 2005).  
However, rhetorical power does not always have negative effects. For example, the exist-
ence of established meanings and interpretive positions can enhance the process of exploita-
tion of existing interpretations and knowledge (Lawrence et al., 2005). On the other hand, if 
several interpretive views of an issue are legitimate because each of the involved ICs sees 
different aspects of the issue and generates different solution paths, the involved individuals 
might not be able to agree on one. In other words, rational decision-making might not be pos-
sible. In order to overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with pluralist interpreta-
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tions and to achieve collective action, it will be necessary for one IC to develop interpretive 
dominance (Lawrence et al., 2005).  
If the generated interpretation is based in a new discourse, actors can use their rhetorical 
power to translate this novel interpretation into a general discourse for similar situations and, 
in this way, disturb existing discourses and institutionalize new ones. Through further dis-
courses they can achieve a partial fixing of the novel interpretation. Its wide dispersion can 
lead to the development of new discourses and ICs that can shape other actors’ understanding 
and interpretations.  
From this perspective, rhetorical power provides “the energy that fuels” decision making 
in a pluralist environment (Lawrence et al., 2005: 188). Power in the knowledge transfer and 
creation process is not a dysfunctional aspect that needs to be remedied. Rather, it is an intrin-
sic part of this process that should be appreciated and understood and appropriately leveraged 
by members of ICs: “Without it, we face strategic paralysis because we lack a mechanism 
with which to make change happen” (Hardy, 1996: S3). 
Conclusion and directions for future research 
It is the relationship between knowledge, discourses and power and their role in the de-
velopment of ICs that is at the heart of this chapter. Through our discussion, we bring cogni-
tion back into our understanding of power and learning. We view individuals as members of a 
number of different ICs and emphasize the unstable, evolving character of human cognition 
and the importance of the battle between the pluralities of interpretation, putting power in the 
centre of a discussion of knowledge transfer and learning. In our view, the power of an IC 
depends on the relevance and importance of its knowledge as well as on its on-going ability to 
enforce its perspective and persuade others of the superiority of its knowledge (Clegg, 1989, 
Fox, 2000; Sillence, 2000).  
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Our approach is multidisciplinary integrating insights from evolutionary economics, organ-
izational learning, cognitive psychology, and CDA and aiming at crossing the existing bound-
aries between different academic disciplines dealing with the same issue but emphasizing 
only single aspects. In our view, more interdisciplinary research is needed in order to under-
stand and explain the complex nature of human interactions and actions. We see this evolving 
both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we need: (1) insightful interdisciplinary 
studies that account for the ways in which particular ICs emerge, develop and disappear; and 
(2) an understanding of the methods by which discursive change and interpretive dominance 
occur and reshape the power structures between ICs. Empirically, we need to engage in multi-
level research that can simultaneously: (1) characterize ICs based upon the cognitive schema 
of the actors; (2) map the actual process of interpretative dominance development; and (3) 
reveal the interaction between ICs in the unstable environment of organizations, coalitions 
and alliances. Ultimately, studies of power and learning should not ignore the connection to 
cognition. Let us not forget that neither discourses nor power relations and structures would 
exist without individuals who create, disseminate, institutionalize and destroy them.
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  Community of practice view Shortcomings 
Emergence of 
communities:  
Explanatory  
factors  
Single factor: engagement within same 
practice.  
Multiple factors: engagement within same practice, educational background, 
social histories, site-specific or local knowledge.  
Origin of  
knowledge 
Practice: “A theory of situated cognition 
suggests that activity and perception are 
importantly and epistemologically prior— 
at a nonconceptual level—to conceptual-
ization” (Brown et al., 1989: 40). 
Practice, i.e. action, together with perception and conception (Bunge, 1983). 
CoP overemphasizes procedural and pragmatic knowledge and learning as a 
process of participating and being able to perform the “practice”, ignoring the 
importance of conceptual knowledge and the possibility of learning through 
labeling, describing, analyzing and justifying; i.e., independently of partici-
pating in a particular practice (Leinhardt et al., 1995). Cognition and action 
cannot be divorced from each other (Neisser, 1976).  
Nature of  
knowledge 
Knowledge exists independent of indi-
viduals; practices/objects as carriers of 
knowledge. 
Individuals as carriers of knowledge; it is individuals’ cognitive maps that 
give meaning to practice, not vice versa (Bunge, 1983). “The patterns of relat-
ing and the cognitive activities encapsulated by the concept ‘community of 
practice’ are possible in the first place because of the pattern recognition and 
completion ability of real brains” (Lakomski, 2004: S93). 
Types of  
knowledge 
Emphasis on the local contextualization of 
knowledge. 
The existence of generalized knowledge is rejected (Lorenz 2001); no inquiry 
into the “mechanisms that might serve to transmit and diffuse knowledge be-
yond the confines of particular places and times” (Lorenz, 2001: 318). 
Knowledge trans-
fer 
Engagement in similar activities (prac-
tices) enables knowledge transfer; knowl-
edge transfer outside of CoP not ex-
plained; individuals within the same 
“practice” transmit and receive informa-
tion non-problematically. 
Collection of workplace narratives is not a sufficient mechanism to provide 
evidence that CoP are successful in transferring knowledge. Rather, the 
univocally interpretation of activities enables knowledge transfer (Lakomski, 
2004). 
Power Power depends on one’s position in the 
CoP (Lave and Wenger, 2002). 
Power is located not only in the position of individuals but in social relations; 
it is relational and diffused throughout society (Clegg, 1989, Scott, 2001). 
Power issue within CoP approach ignored (e.g., Fox, 2000). 
Table 1: Community of practice view: assumptions and shortcomings
  
                                                 
i This is the realist version of discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2005; Reed, 2004). According to the main, social 
constructivist version of discourse analysis, “organizations exist only in so far as their members create them 
through discourse” (Mumby and Clair, 1997: 181). In contrast, the realist version stresses that discursive prac-
tices are “constrained by the fact that they inevitably take place within a constituted material reality, with pre-
constituted objects and pre-constituted social subjects” (Fairclough, 1992: 60). It forbears from the view that a 
“collective identity [is] a linguistically produced object embodied in talk and other forms of text, rather than [] 
a set of beliefs [or interpretations] held in members’ minds.” (Hardy et al., 2005: 62). Thus, the social construc-
tivist form of discourse analysis is quite similar to the view of practices as carriers of knowledge as suggested 
by the CoP approach. We show that there is no such thing as convergent linguistic practices without the exist-
ence of some shared cognitive maps between the involved individuals. 
ii Our approach is based on a realist ontology combined with an epistemological constructivism and epistemic 
relativism (also Acroyd and Fleetwood, 2005). 
iii In practice, it is difficult to differentiate clearly between these subtypes of rhetorical power as they are closely 
interwoven (Scott, 2001). 
iv Studies of IT consulting projects provide an example how consultants use managerial discourses to establish 
themselves, i.e. their knowledge and practices, as an “obligatory passage point” in the eyes of clients (Bloom-
field and Best, 1992). Zelizer (1993) discusses this process in the case of journalists. 
